The Jerusalem Post maintained that Israel must tie advances in the peace process and support for Abbas to suppression of terror, a view echoed by Likud hard-liner Benjamin Nethanyahu. The Daily Star (Beirut) maintained that Israel must not tie advances in the peace process and support for Abbas to suppression of terror. In Haaretz, Danny Rubenstein commented that Abbas will be like Arafat in a suit, making the same demands of Israel as Arafat did, but doing so in an orderly manner. No doubt there will be many similar articles on all sides of the question. The settlers' Web site, Arutz 7, quoted Abu Mazen as saying in his victory speech that the "little Jihad [holy war] had ended, and now the big Jihad is beginning," a statement they view as portending yet more violence.^* These and similar comments foreshadow a continuation of the status quo impasse in Israeli-Palestinian relations, rather than the hoped-for new era.

The commentaries almost all focus on the issues of democracy and Israeli-Palestinian relations and avoid or neglect some essential points. While there is no doubt that the orderly polling and democratic process deserve praise, the limitations of these elections must be noted. Abbas got over 60% of the vote. His closest oponent got about 21% of the vote, an overwhelming victory that occurs rarely if at all in real mature democracies. His major potential opponent, Marwan Barghouthi, withdrew from the election after Fatah functionaries visited him in his Israeli jail cell and apparently "made him an offer he cannot refuse." Later, Barghouthi also said that he never really intended to run, and meekly supported Abbas's candidacy.

Only a few months ago, Abbas was considered a failed and powerless politician. His support evaporated during his term as Prime Minister. Fatah derided him as a tool of the Americans and Israelis, and Israel and the US were not forthcoming with concessions that could bolster his popularity. Like ex-Israeli PM Ehud Barak, Abbas gambled on peace and lost. He was considered to be a Palestinian Barak or Peres, a "loser." Nonetheless, Abbas's political fortunes were resurrected. He was elected because of a decision by the Fatah to put their support behind a candidate who had the tacit backing of the United States and Israel, in order to give the Palestinians the best chance to advance their cause. In other words, Abbas was probably elected by machine politics rather than popular acclaim and free choice. The elections were not accompanied by parliamentary elections, which are only due to be held next summer.

For better or worse, Abbas is saddled with Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala). The post of Prime Minister was originally created at the insistence of the US and EU, who wanted a counterweight to Arafat who could take the necessary measures for unifying security forces, cleaning up corruption and suppressing violence. Qurei, who replaced Abbas in the post of Prime Minister, proved adept at following Arafat's wishes and doing nothing effective toward reforming the Palestinian Authority. It remains to be seen what role he will play now, and whether reform attempts by Abbas will lead to a power struggle. It is by no means certain who will be "the real power" in Palestine: the elected President Abbas, the Prime Minister appointed by Arafat, or the PLO-Tunis machine that manipulates Palestinian politics behind the scenes.

Mustafa Barghouthi, a popular independent candidate, got about 20 to 24% of the vote. As opposed to Abbas, Barghouthi represents local grass roots Palestinian sentiment rather than the imported apparatus of PLO apparatchiks, and may be the best chance for real democratic reform. He is considered more "extreme" than Abbas in his stance toward Israel. However, Barghouthi's background in the Palestinian Communist Party (PPP) can be interpreted both ways, since PPP is the only Palestinian party that always recognized the existence of the State of Israel and the right of the Jewish people to self-determination, having accepted the UN partition plan of 1947. It remains to be seen if Barghouthi's support at the Presidential polls can be translated into a real parliamentary force for democracy.

Palestinians certainly hope that Abbas will not be "Arafat in a suit." The main issues for Palestinians in this election perhaps were putting an end to the corruption and chaos engendered by Arafat and his PLO-Tunis cronies. The big question is whether Abbas, a product of the same old-guard political machine, can carry out the reforms needed to turn Palestinian society into an orderly state-in-the-making that can provide for the basic security, welfare and democratic rights of its citizens.

From the Israeli point of view, it may well be that Abbas will be "Arafat in a suit", committed to the same unacceptable goals as his predecessor, including securing the "right" of several million refugees to "return" to Israel and turn Israeli into a Palestinian state. During the campaign, Abbas announced his support for "right of return" on several occasions. In a fit of anger after Israelis killed Palestinian civilians, he also mentioned his commitment to fight "the Zionist enemy," a phrase left over from the days when it was taboo to say "Israel," and implying that the existence of Zionism is irrevocably incompatible with Palestinian objectives. Nonetheless, a leader who can present Palestinians' demands, justified or otherwise, in an orderly and decent way, and who can give Palestinian society a democratic image, can be much more effective for the Palestinians and far more difficult for Israel to counter than the swashbuckling, unreliable and irresponsible Arafat.

The vision of imminent public peace negotiations advanced by many is unlikely to come true. Public Israeli-Palestinian negotiations would be faced with two seemingly impossible impasses. The first is that while Israel, as noted in the Jerusalem Post, insists that there can be no negotiations while violence continues, the Palestinians, as noted in the Daily Star, insist that there can be be no end to violence until the occupation ends. Even if he wanted to, Israeli PM Ariel Sharon doesn't have the political support to initiate peace negotiations and make meaningful concessions while violence continues.

The second problem is that while the Palestinians, including Abbas, are committed to return of the refugees in any final settlement, Israel could never possibly accept that condition, since it would mean the end of Israel as a Jewish national home. It is unlikely that in the foreseeable future, Abbas will be in a strong enough position to give up on right of return, and it is equally unlikely that he will be strong enough to act against the Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Fatah Al-Aqsa Brigades in order to suppress terror, or to secure a promise to stop violence while the occupation continues, even if he really wanted to do those things.

How can these obstacles be overcome? The rhetoric must be harnessed to reality, and conflicting national goals must be channeled into peace. Progress by "synchronous unilateralism" and other indirect subterfuges is more likely than public negotiations and confrontation. Synchronous unilateralism has solved problems in the past. Each side takes a seemingly unrelated action that just happens to coincide with the demands of the other side. For example, Egypt released the jailed Israeli Azzam Azzam, and a short while later, Israel released six Egyptian students held for spying. Everyone understood that the two deals were linked, but officially they could make believe that there was no deal and no concessions had been made. In the same way, Israel might release Palestinian prisoners for example, and Abbas would just happen to consolidate PNA security forces soon after.

Fruitful negotiations will be held, if at all, away from the limelight and without photo-ops and ballyhoo. Regarding final status, as neither side can give up on the refugee issue at present, they may put it aside. Through the UN, the US and EU will "unilaterally" provide alternative solutions for permanent settlement of refugees. The Israeli side will assume the issue is dead. The Palestinian leadership will tell their people that the decision about the refugees is deferred, but will add some phrase such as "The Fatah Revolutionary Movement will never surrender the legitimate right of the Palestinian Refugees to return to their homes." Operative decisions about borders, demilitarization, water and other issues may be reached in quiet clandestine negotiations - a new edition of the "Beilin-Abu Mazen agreement." Then the Israelis will "unilaterally" "disengage" from the West Bank as well as Gaza, and the Palestinians will "unilaterally" declare a state. Ariel Sharon will proclaim that he didn't negotiate with terrorists, and Abbas will proclaim that he didn't give up the fight against the Zionist Enemy. Each side will insist that they decry the unilateral facts on the ground imposed by the other side, and will keep their pride, their rhetoric and their slogans. Both sides will then quietly go on with the rest of their lives. Peace will have been achieved without trumpets and fanfare, and will be celebrated with quiet sighs of relief rather than with cries of joy.

Ami Isseroff

* In Islamic tradition, the "little Jihad" usually refers to an actual war against enemies, while the "big Jihad" refers to an inner spiritual struggle for self-improvement.