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CONFESSIONS OF A PRO-ISRAEL ANTI-ZIONIST

© 1999 Matthew C. Hogan

Matthew Hogan, New York USA

J.D. – Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas
B.A.– (History) University of Dallas, Irving, Texas

Former Staff and Citation Editor, The International Lawyer, Official International Law Journal, American Bar Association

 Introduction: Beyond Judging the Heart

Bad habits and failure to agree to disagree hinder peacemaking. An inescapable cycle of failure centered on recrimination ensues when issues to agree to disagree about are not defined. I have witnessed this personally when helping Arab/Jewish dialogue groups. Below I want to examine the bad habits and suggest ways to escape them.

I hope therein also to identify the areas of irreconcilable dispute and suggest approaches to peace dialog and peace process substance that get around those areas. I wish to show how ideology can be a surmountable barrier rather than a whole obstacle. To that end, I will offer myself as a "pro-Israel anti-Zionist" to explain how ideology can be finessed to reach surprising but hopeful conclusions.

The first bad habit in Middle East peacemaking, and maybe the worst, is the
folly of trying to judge hearts. As someone who is not Jewish and a critic of Israel and downright unZionist in view, I have received my share of mutually contradictory brickbats of that type: Fool, crafty devil, anti-Semite, naïve idealist, propagandist, dupe for Arabs, ignoramus, overly focused, biased, insensitive, etc. As a non-Arab non-Muslim critic of Arab nationalism and culture as well as Islamic fundamentalism, I have also been "accused" being: a Jew, an Orientalist, an American (ooh, that hurts), a crypto-Arab who is self-hating, a Zionist, an Israeli spy, a CIA spy, a Christian zealot, etc. The "American" part is correct.

In the above all-too-common experience appears the shared arrogance and wrong-headed focus on the importance and alleged ability of judging the hearts of others. In more cybernetic language, the bug in the system is that discussants are constantly in people-judging mode rather than problem-solving mode. Judging people is a very inexact science. Most of us can’t evaluate fully our own hearts, much less others’. On a pragmatic level, it is destructive and annoying.

 A greater priority instead should be understanding the "other side’s" heartfelt points of view, whether right or wrong. Little effort is made to do the hard work of identifying and separating issues of principle (whatever the motives for those principles) in order to see how to work through or around the disputes that follow from them. Peacemaking is difficult because it is the art of trying to make violently emotional issues simultaneously boring and inspiring.

I start with what divides the "two" sides, regardless of the level of a person’s peace-orientation. One issue I find to be fundamental among disputants. All current and historic rights and wrongs are usually evaluated and all aspirations are defined from it. Even those who agree on a particular general solution often fall out because they have not agreed on the divisive principle or, more practically, agreed to disagree on it. In fact, they probably have not even articulated it to themselves much less to each other.

 The Core Debate Identified

The fundamental differences revolve one principle and its direct contradiction. I label Principle A, the Zionist one. Principle B is the non- or anti-Zionist one. Reasons for that will be explained.

Principle A: Jews as a group have had an enduring entitlement, merely as a result of their identity, to national statehood within the geographic area historically called Palestine.

Principle B: No, they don’t.

Let’s save the trouble of exploring the minutiae of nationalist esoterica and history. Principle A covers the concept "Zionism" nicely for practical purposes. It’s the basic emotional subtext. A wise law professor, Neil Cogan at Southern Methodist University in Texas, started an insightful address on the conflict by introducing himself in several ways: a law professor, former faculty member of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, a Jew, an American, and a "Zionist." The latter identification he explained succinctly as meaning that he believed "in the right of the Jewish people to a state in Palestine." Simple and useful.

To avoid too much debate on the Principle issue above, a useful way to find oneself in the distinction may emerge from the following exercise. Consider this sentence:

1) The Jewish population of Palestine increased in the 1930s and 1940s in part due to illegal immigration.

Now I will rephrase it:

2) The Jewish population of Palestine increased in the 1930s and 1940s in part due to "illegal" immigration.

If sentence 2 makes you more comfortable with the sentence you are probably a Principle A’er. If it makes you less comfortable, you are probably a Principle B’er.

The reasons one may subscribe to Principle A, the Zionist one, and the definitions of its scope vary dramatically by person. But one can find it in "bi-nationalist" pacifists, aggressive Kahanists, Christian millenialists, and anti-Arab bigots as well as those who subscribe for more common reasons that are usually historical, moral, religious or sentimental. Interestingly, subscribers to the principle often fight among themselves over the scope and basis of the definition as viciously as they do with those who disagree about the principle.

The same applies to Principle B. Principle A is sometimes rejected because one is an anti-Semite, an Arab nationalist, a Jewish anti-nationalist, a "one-world" idealist, an anti-nationalist in general, or a host of other reasons. They include religious, historical, moral, and sentimental approaches. Subscribers to Principle B also fight among each other with a vigorousness as intense as their fights with adherents of opposite Principle A.

To clarify terms further, the label "Zionist" has an additional specific meaning: a particular political movement that started in 1897 adhering approximately to ideology A. It has been successful to at least some extent. It culminated in the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 and institutionally exists in some state and related institutions. That specific meaning is the preferable one to me, but for this essay I use the term "Zionist" for anyone who adheres to Principle A. Although possibly arguable, I think you will find the overlap between those who adopt Principle A and those who call themselves Zionists are fairly congruent.

 Agreeing to Disagree

Where does this all go? Hopefully towards arriving at areas to agree to disagree. Fundamentally, the principled debate I have described is at the heart of all Middle East (Arab-Israeli) debates and emotionalism. And so for peacemaking in the practical problem-solving sense, the first logical question would be: can we get some agreement on those principles? The realistic answer, as anyone who’s been around such debates knows, is probably not in the immediate future. This unlikelihood is very hard to accept, especially by peace camp members. Many peaceworkers from both sides, who honestly believe they really do agree to disagree on the debate of principles, really do not. That’s why peace efforts often degenerate to useless cycles of recrimination.

 Avoiding Finger-Pointing and Finger-Jabbing: Presuming Good Faith Differences and Interpretations

The goal of peace dialogue ought then to be finding a way to reconcile the adherents of the Zionist principle with the adherents of the non- or anti- Zionist principle Those who wish to do so may debate the whole nationalism issue in order to seek consensus and further understanding, but that will be a longer debate, not necessary for practical peace. A further danger is that if personal relationships are not strong enough, it may even be destructive to productive interaction.

What I suggest instead is that since neither side will give in on principle where it believes itself right, each side should at least recognize that the other side may believe their principle in good faith and interprets everything – historical acts and future proposals -- accordingly. Put aside the folly of judging the others’ hearts. Presume those partisans who offer themselves as interested in peace to have the best motives for their partisan beliefs. While one should be prepared at all times for the worst in others, still if you are a sincere peacemaker, treat the best as always possible.

Before getting in to the questions of substance in Middle East peacemaking, we should take note of certain problems in the process. A key obstacle is finger-pointing. Finger-pointing is difficult to suppress. We are moral beings and those who care about the people involved are going to feel powerfully about the rights and wrongs what happens to them. But for practical purposes of peacemaking, adherents of Principle A and B need to recognize that the other group at this time generally considers the crimes committed by their own "side", or in its name, not to be crimes on the same scale as you view them. The other side considers them "excesses", "understandable overreactions", forgivable or justifiable "necessities", "failings" in a justified cause, and in quite a few cases, merely false accusations.

Proponents of Principle A see the initial Zionist collaboration with Britain, illegal immigration, the terrorism campaigns of the mid-1940s, the forceful establishment of a state over the wishes of the Arab majority, the expulsion and exclusion of the Arab population, intimidation raids, preemptive strikes and occupation as at best justifiable actions for liberation or simply figments of enemy imagination; at worst, they are seen as sad excesses in the course of securing a justified goal (according to Principle A.) Proponents of Principle B in turn see the anti-Jewish atrocities of the 1920s, the armed uprisings of the 1930s, the warfare and threats of the 1940s, violence against Jews in the Arab countries, warfare, and terrorism over the next decades and "scud cheering" in 1991 as being understandable though in many instances wrong actions, reactions, or tragic excesses in a reasonable and worthy cause. Or merely false claims of enemy propaganda.

The way to get past the finger-pointing is to abandon judging the heart. One has to assume – and this is a huge MUST -- that the adherents of the other principle each hold their perspectives in good faith, not out of conscious bigotry, or malice. They may have entirely silly motives for their outlook. But by presuming their good faith, you will avoid bogging down the practical discussion in unnecessary mutual accusations sprinkled with insulting and ignorant psychoanalysis. Also, by concentrating on the practical process, you can spot and weed out the enemies of peace from one’s own and the other side, because these cannot stand the cooperative atmosphere or the utterly intolerable assumption that someone on the other side is acting in good faith.

Avoiding Personal and Political Self-Righteousness: Visions of Victory As Decisive Factor in Peacemaking

Once one presumes good faith, the practical debate moves forward. It addresses how to end the existing or potential violence in a way that might meet the practical acceptance of the bulk of each side. How to approach this may be found best in a cynical observation from an expert on war and peace, Von Clausewitz. "A conqueror," he has said, "is always a lover of peace." (Think of "conqueror" in the sense of "victor" or "prevailer," not necessarily aggressor.) Those who feel that enough conditions exist to say that justice has sufficiently prevailed tend to favor and participate in peace activism.

The relation of peace to perception of victory is very evident in the Middle East. Sadat had to produce a victory – even symbolic -- in order to offer public peace. (This explains his refusal to pull back from east of Suez when military necessity required it; he needed a showing of victorious canal crossing.) Public peace efforts increased from the Palestinian leadership after the perceived "victory" of the intifada in exposing the failure of Israel to fully pacify the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinian efforts then faded noticeably under the vicarious defeat of Arab Iraq. The Israeli peace movement grew especially after the 1967 and Lebanon wars showed that Israel had secured many of its goals.

Peace movements are often emotionally the result of magnanimity, and magnanimity is a virtue common to winners. Peace movements are about options and taking risks and winners have much greater options and room to risk. In the case of the Middle East, many Israelis have most of what they want and believe themselves entitled to – a stable and generally prosperous state open to unlimited Jewish immigration at will; a state which is present and dominant in the territory of traditional Palestine; and a condition where hostile forces are limited and mostly cowed and neutralized. Palestinian Arab life on the other hand largely includes powerless stateless refugees and their descendants, daily military occupation, land confiscation, frustrated memories of a whole society they may never see again, and an uncertain entity representing them. In short, they have little or nothing of what they want and little or nothing of what they feel they deserve. Such people are more skeptical of peace organizations.

In fact, for those who feel non-prevailing, "peace" is often interpreted to mean "surrender" and persons who advocate surrender are not only not popular among those who perceive them as surrendering, they may find themselves threatened. Where one side sees a Gandhi emerging from the other side, members of that other side -- particularly if large numbers feel defeated and humiliated -- see only Marshall Petain or Vidkun Quisling. Yitzhak Rabin, Issam Sartawi, Gandhi himself, Malcolm X, and Irish rebel leader Michael Collins are just some politically daring people struck down by members of their own community when they were seen as "surrendering" rather than seeking reconciliation.

The differences between "peace" and "hawk" camps on both sides are not necessarily a difference in abstract ethics of non-violence or in patriotic/nationalistic motivation. Rather it is often a difference in how the groups define the details of victory. For many Israeli hawks, there will be no victory until there is a political and/or demographic absorption of the West Bank; for most Israeli peaceniks, that is not necessary or desirable for victory. On the Arab side it is more problematic and difficult. Many Palestinians do not feel there is sufficient justice while a Zionist or Jewish state exists in traditional Palestine at all. Many more feel that at least the refugee Palestinians should be allowed to return even if Israel is recognized. Far more feel that a Palestinian state is a minimum for feeling a sense of prevailing, and conclude that that has become doubtful under Netanyahu’s realization of Oslo, which was the last round of peacemaking. Still more feel that the conditions of occupation – land confiscations, checkpoints, curfews, etc. -- need immediate change first.

 Practical Solution Suggestion: Two-State, Reconciling Victory Perceptions, and No Ideological Imposition

 Let’s apply this importance of competing perceptions of victory to the problem of practical peace movement development as a whole. A peaceful settlement should entail circumstances that will allow the bulk of both sides to enjoy a sufficient sense of "victory" to end the frustrations and insecurities which underlie a preference for violent solutions. To that end, I personally advocate a more or less standard final picture.

A fair peace plan encompasses compensation of refugees by Israel (with some limited return), naturalization of Palestinians by existing states or an Arab state of Palestine, statehood for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza with border adjustments for security and demographic needs -- including perhaps adding portions of Israeli Arab areas to a Palestinian state if the communities desire -- alongside a fully recognized (locally and regionally), militarily secure, and politically normalized Jewish majority state of Israel. I would also add that acts of apology and a truth and reconciliation commission like South Africa should be established for political acts on both sides that both can agree were impermissible.

As important or more, however, is that arguments for any permanent plan ought not be framed with a supposition that one’s own views of the contrasting core values– of Principles A or B --must be accepted by the "other side". Neither side should require the other to acquiesce intellectually in terms of ideology. Arabs can continue to reject the ideology or movement Zionism in their texts and Israelis can laud it in their ceremonies. Israelis should not be required to renounce a Zionist basis for their self-definition of Israeli statehood by, for example, putting the Law of Return on the conference table rather than leaving it to the discretion of Israeli society and state where it belongs. The two sides can, of course, "dialogue" on the conflicting ideologies for greater understanding at their separate leisure. Both sides, however, should mute their criticisms of the other as matter of good judgment.

In the meantime, accept that the "other side" will view the ideological principle of your side as wrong and will not honor or respect those who fought and died for its realization and will continue to honor, justify, excuse or otherwise fail to condemn strongly those who have committed terrible violent actions in the past when done for the aim of advancing their own side’s principle. (A good example of this duality can be found in the Great Lakes area of the USA. Just read the monuments on the American side to heroes of the war of 1812 and then read the Canadian monuments on the other side to British and Canadian struggles against "the [American] invader." Yet the two countries get along quite well these days.)

An essential part of the reconciliation process is to develop and advance arguments for the final result that do not require the other side to acquiesce in your view of Principle A or B. Arguments need to coalesce around common areas of interest, realism, and broader shared principles.

To illustrate, on the core issue of the divisive principles, I offer myself as a pro-Israel anti-Zionist. By that I mean that I am a Principle B’er in theory (that is, I am not a Zionist) but I find that the hitherto divisive issue of statehood for Israel (with a definably Jewish character) is a separate issue to which a positive answer can be offered. For me as an American it is not an issue. My country recognizes Israel and I am happy with that. But for Arabs the establishment of Israel has usually been seen as an unjust intrusion and for many its continuance remains an obstacle to their perceptions of an honorable victory. To reverse this, arguments must be made but it must be done from non-Zionist principles in order to succeed.

Surprisingly, the idea of a non-Zionist justification for Israel shocks, puzzles, and even outrages many Zionists (as well as non-Zionists). That is surprising because few apparently realize that probably no country that recognizes Israel or is even supportive does so for Zionist reasons. A perfect example was the Soviet Union in 1948. A Communist state, it was non-Zionist, even anti-Zionist, on principle. Yet it supported Jewish statehood in Palestine via the partition plan and provided the decisive military material needed to establish the state of Israel. The USA only gave de- facto recognition, meaning it was not convinced of any special statehood right. The reluctance of most countries even today to place Embassies in Jerusalem indicates that friendly countries are actually rather wary of the tangle of ethnic and religious nationalist claims (from all sides) involved.

The idea that there is some abstract connection of "right" between Jewish peoplehood on Earth and nation-statehood in Palestine is not compelling to Principle B'ers, including Arabs. From my own personal perspective, I can see why. I do not believe that Palestine Arab descendants of emigrants from 1920s Haifa to Brazil have any national claim, as a result of their identity, to Israel or to an Arab Palestine. If either entity wants to give them an interest, that’s fine but there is none "hanging in space." If Gypsies attempted to colonize parts of India where there ancestors came from and about which they have maintained a profound historical memory, the Indians would be right to scoff that off, with armed force, despite even such things as the honesty of the claim, the urgency of the fate faced under Hitler, and the absence of a state anywhere else. "Uniqueness" gives rise to no territorial claims outside where one actually lives in preponderance, and "next year in Jerusalem" has no incantatory legal power, although Principle B’ers should recognize that such factors evidence at least the good faith of the Principle A claim.

Now a person of Principle A does not have to accept the above arguments as correct or as an accurate reflection of their perspective. Further, in practical peacemaking, that Principle A person should also not be expected to acquiesce in the above argument. But the reason for the argument is to emphasize that we need to develop persuasive arguments for acceptance by Principle B'ers (which include most Arabs) of Israel’s legitimacy. Finding arguments outside of Zionist ones should not be difficult given the fact that most nations that recognize Israel do so for reasons that are separate from, and even in spite of, Principle A conclusions or premises.

Let’s start with simple reality. Israel is a nation-state, boringly similar to all the others. It issues passports, postage stamps, traffic tickets, customs duty rates, etc. A state is a neutral entity. It does not matter how it was created or even much of what it does. A child of a rape is as much a child as one of a loving act of consensual passion.

Once the state was established and accepted among the other states, as happened in 1949-1950, the issue of legitimacy ought to have ended. From the Arab side, an argument is made (with which I am in sympathy) that Israel owes its existence to extensive use of violence and terror. As an argument, however, this overlooks reality: nation-states are positively credentialed should they show they are good at violence and terror on a large and permanent scale. That’s why governments exist, good ones and bad ones alike. Insofar as the state of Israel is capable of delivering force effectively and systematically, its raw qualifications as a state, at least de facto, are actually enhanced.

Thus, by separating issues we find ourselves heading towards surprising areas of agreement rather than dispute. All sane observers and partisans agree that Israel won its establishment through a successful war and has basically kicked the butts of anyone who’s tried to reverse that. And its relative military capability has only increased exponentially since then. It also has a rich and powerful uncle (the USA) who will back it up. A functioning state exists to be able to defeat all comers for the long run. The statehood issue is over. This is not "might makes right." This is "might makes reality". The object of peacemakers is to reform reality towards more peaceful arrangements in a workable manner. To make life better and safer for those who live in it. And that requires first an acceptance of reality. Developing a situation more moral may require extensive change and sacrifice, but it ought not to require hallucinations.

Most countries now up and running owe their history to conquest, royalism, religious exclusivism, imperialist borders, and many other processes that one can consider dangerous and evil. The country of the world that has the biggest influence over all issues of legitimacy – my own, the USA -- owes its existence to colonial settlement and genocidal expansion. It owes its dominance to its potential ability and demonstrated willingness to incinerate anyone found threatening.

Even with less cynical principles, Israel’s legitimacy still works for anti-Zionists if you separate issues from ideology. Let us turn to international law. Often Principle B’ers often speak of international law principles and hold Israel to it. Yet, one need only go as far as Article 2 of the UN Charter, much less numerous binding Security Council resolutions, to see that it demands respect for the sovereign equality of its members. Israel is a member state, however unjust one may feel that to be. The principle of international sovereignty has thus been decided. One is free to view it as a bad or corrupt decision, but it is still a fact that can be agreed on without having to accept Zionist Principle A.

Still further arguments can be advanced for those of Principle B who are less inclined to be partisan. Israel represents a population which sought and seeks self-determination. Again, it does not matter that the self-determination may include territory regarded as misappropriated, or territory which would have an Arab majority if the refugees had been allowed to return. It does not matter if one finds an unsavory history of force and collaboration with a foreign Empire. There is still a viable issue of self-determination of settled persons with a concrete distinct sense of identity and culture who were born or migrated there in good faith, and validated under color of law. Problems of ethnic composition of the state, personal dispossession, and property can be settled by agreed adjustments in borders, cash, physical settlement, other guarantees etc.

As to self-determination and popular validation, Israel’s democracy, though derided for removing most of its Arabs first, nonetheless still functions as a real democracy with representative institutions. As an institution, therefore, it has more legitimacy among those it claims to govern than most of its Arab neighbors. The leadership regularly cleans out its desk and leaves office when voted out. This is no small accomplishment for any mass of humanity.

Thus, the merits or lack of them of Zionist Principle A are irrelevant to the "legitimacy" of the state it created.

The above arguments do not mean that one becomes an aggressor by waging war against or not making immediate peace with a legitimate state. Germany was a legitimate state in the 1930s; there was nothing wrong with defeating it utterly when it invaded its neighbors. But to make an issue out of Israel’s core legitimacy after its successful establishment, general recognition, and forceful resistance to overthrow is wholly unnecessary to maintaining an anti- or non- Zionist position. Worse, in some respects, it is frighteningly and unfathomably stupid.

Practical peace is made by getting past disagreements. I suggested above some measures to get past it. All involved should avoid trying to judge the other’s heart, favoring instead presuming good faith and seeking to separate issues from ideology. In particular, I suggest that we identify core ideologies most separating the two sides. The core ideological distinctions revolve around one’s views of Zionism as defined according to a basic premise that there has always existed a Jewish claim of right to national statehood in Palestine.

I believe that peace activism increases as each side feels there are enough results to help one feel that one’s side has sufficiently prevailed in its aims, while not being compelled to accept the ideological justifications of the other side. As a concrete matter, I believe this would lead to the standard two state solution of mutual recognition, compensation for refugees, Law of Return entrusted to Israel at its discretion etc. An essential hitherto missing ingredient has been developing an argument for Israel’s legitimacy that will persuade anti- and non-Zionists. This will allow Arabs to buy into the peace plan with less feeling that they are betraying principle and no need to engage in nationalistic disputes and recriminations. I suggested doing so on the basis of a) cynical realism about the nature of states, b) international law, and c) moral principles of self-determination and democracy.

It is my hope at minimum that the above essay helps the process by at least identifying the main area of disagreements and ways to get around them.

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