GIVE PEACE A CHANCE

• The Full Text
• U.S. letters to Israel
• Human Rights Watch Commentary
• Nigel Parry's Version
• The CIA's involvement
• Oslo Agreement

"The following are steps to facilitate implementation of the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip of September 28, 1995 and other related agreements including the Note for the Record of January 17, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as "the prior agreements") so that the Israeli and Palestinian sides can more effectively carry out their reciprocal responsibilities, including those relating to further redeployments and security, respectively. These steps are to be carried out in a parallel phased approach in accordance with the Memorandum and the attached time line. They are subject to the relevant terms and conditions of the prior agreements and do not supersede their other requirements.



I. FURTHER REDEPLOYMENTS

A. Phase One and Two Further Redeployments

1. Pursuant to the Interim Agreement and subsequent agreements, the Israeli side's implementation of the first and second F.R.D. will consist of the transfer to the Palestinian side of 13 percent from Area C as follows: 1 percent to Area (A); 12 percent to Area (B).

The Palestinian side has informed that it will allocate an area/areas amounting to 3 percent from the above area (B) to be designated as the Green Areas and/or Nature Reserves. The Palestinian side has further informed that they will act according to the established scientific standards, and that therefore there will be no changes to the status of these areas, without prejudice to the rights of existing inhabitants in these areas including Bedouins; while these standards do not allow new construction in these areas, existing roads and buildings may be maintained.

The Israeli side will retain in these Green Areas/Nature Reserves the overriding security responsibility for the purpose of protecting Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism. Activities and movements of the Palestinian Police forces may be carried out after coordination and confirmation; the Israeli side will respond to such requests expeditiously.

2. As part of the foregoing implementation of the first and second F.R.D., 14.2 percent from Area (B) will become Area (A).

B. Third Phase of Further Redeployments.

With regard to the terms of the Interim Agreement and of Secretary Christopher's letters to the two sides of January 17, 1997, relating to the further redeployment process, there will be a committee to address this question. The United States will be briefed regularly.



II. SECURITY

In the provisions on security arrangements of the Interim Agreement, the Palestinian side agreed to take all measures necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism, crime and hostilities directed against the Israeli side, against individuals falling under the Israeli side's authority and against their property, just as the Israeli side agreed to take all measures necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism, crime and hostilities and against their property. The two sides also agreed to take legal measures against within their jurisdiction and to prevent incitement against each other by any organizations, groups or individuals within their jurisdiction.

Both sides recognize that it is in their vital interests to combat terrorism and fight violence in accord with Annex I of the Interim Agreement and the Note for the Record. They also recognize that the struggle against terror and violence must be comprehensive in that it deals with terrorists, the terror support structure and the environment conducive to the support of terror. It must be continuous and constant over a long-term, in that there can be no pauses in the work against terrorists and their structure. It must be cooperative in that no effort can be fully effective without Israeli-Palestinian cooperation and the continuous exchange of information, concepts and actions.

Pursuant to the prior agreements, the Palestinian side's implementation of its responsibilities for security, security cooperation, and other issues will be as detailed below during the time periods specified in the attached time line.

A. Security Actions

1. Outlawing and Combatting Terrorist Organizations

a. The Palestinian side will make known its policy for zero tolerance for terror and violence against both sides.

b. A work plan developed by the Palestinian side will be shared with the U.S. and hereafter implementation will begin immediately to ensure the systematic and effective combat of terrorist organizations and their infrastructure.

c. In addition to the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation, a U.S.-Palestinian committee will meet biweekly to review the steps being taken to eliminate terrorist cells and the support structure that plans, finances, supplies and abets terror. In these meetings, the Palestinian side will inform the U.S. fully of the actions it has taken to outlaw all organizations (or wings of organizations, as appropriate) of a military, terrorist or violent character and their support structure and to prevent them from operating in areas under its jurisdiction.

d. The Palestinian side will apprehend the specific individuals suspected of perpetrating acts of violence and terror for the purpose of further investigation, and prosecution and punishment of all persons involved in acts of violence and terror.

e. A U.S.-Palestinian committee will meet to review and evaluate information pertinent to the decisions on prosecution, punishment or other legal measures which affect the status of individuals suspected of abetting or perpetrating acts of violence or terror.

2. Prohibiting Illegal Weapons

a. The Palestinian side will ensure an effective legal framework is in place to criminalize, in conformity with the prior agreements, any importation, manufacturing or unlicensed sale, acquisition or possession of firearms, ammunition or weapons in areas under Palestinian jurisdiction.

b. In addition, the Palestinian side will establish and vigorously and continuously implement a systematic program for the collection and appropriate handling of all such illegal items in accordance with the prior agreements. The U.S. has agreed to assist in carrying out this program.

c. A U.S.-Palestinian-Israeli committee will be established to assist and enhance cooperation in preventing the smuggling or other unauthorized introduction of weapons or explosive materials into areas under Palestinian jurisdiction.

3. Preventing Incitement

a. Drawing on relevant international practice and pursuant to Article XXII (1) of the Interim Agreement and Note for the Record, the Palestinian side will issue a decree prohibiting all forms of incitement to violence or terror. This decree will be comparable to the existing Israeli legislation which deals with the same subject.

b. A U.S.-Palestinian-Israeli committee will meet on a regular basis to monitor cases of possible incitement to violence or terror, and to make recommendations and reports on how to prevent such incitement. The Israeli-Palestinian and U.S. sides will each appoint a media specialist, a law enforcement representative, an educational specialist and a current or former elected official to the committee.

B. Security Cooperation

The two sides agree that their security cooperation will be based on a spirit of partnership and will include, among other things, the following steps:

1. Bilateral Cooperation

There will be full bilateral cooperation between the two sides which will be continuous, intensive and comprehensive.

2. Forensic Cooperation

There will be an exchange of forensic expertise, training and other assistance.

3. Trilateral Committee

In addition to the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation, a high-ranking U.S.-Palestinian-Israeli committee will meet as required and not less than biweekly to assess current threats, deal with any impediments to effective security cooperation and coordination and address the steps being taken to combat terror and terrorist organizations. The committee will also serve as a forum to address the issue of external support for terror. In these meetings, the Palestinian side will fully inform the members of the committee of the results of its investigations concerning terrorist suspects already in custody and the participants will exchange addition relevant information. The committee will report regularly to the leaders of the two sides on the status of cooperation, the results of the meetings and its recommendations.

C. Other Issues

1. Palestinian Police Force

a. The Palestinian side will provide a list of its policemen to the Israeli side in conformity with the prior agreements.

b. Should the Palestinian side request technical assistance, the U.S. has indicated its willingness to help meet these needs in cooperation with other donors.

c. The Monitoring and Steering Committee will, as part of its functions, monitor the implementation of this provision and brief the U.S.

2. PLO Charter

The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Central Council will reaffirm the letter of 22 January 1998 from PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat to President Clinton concerning the nullification of the Palestinian National Charter provisions that are inconsistent with the letters exchanged between the PLO and the Government of Israel on 9/10 September 1993. PLO Chairman Arafat, the Speaker of the Palestine National Council, and the Speaker of the Palestinian Council will invite the members of the PNC, as well as the members of the Central Council, the Council, and the Palestinian Heads of Ministries to a meeting to be addressed by President Clinton to reaffirm their support for the peace process and the aforementioned decisions of the Executive Committee and the Central Council.

3. Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters

Among other forms of legal assistance in criminal matters, the requests for arrest and transfer of suspects and defendants pursuant to Article II (7) of Annex IV of the Interim Agreement will be submitted (or resubmitted) through the mechanism of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Legal Committee and will be responded to in conformity with Article II (7) (f) of Annex IV of the Interim Agreement within the twelve week period. Requests submitted after the eighth week will be responded to in conformity with Article II (7) (f) within four weeks of their submission. The U.S. has been requested by the sides to report on a regular basis on the steps being taken to respond to the above requests.

4. Human Rights and the Rule of Law

Pursuant of Article XI (1) of Annex I of the Interim Agreement, and without derogating from the above, the Palestinian Police will exercise powers and responsibilities to implement this Memorandum with due regard to internationally accepted norms of human rights and the rule of law, and will be guided by the need to protect the public, respect human dignity, and avoid harassment.



III. INTERIM COMMITTEES AND ECONOMIC ISSUES

1. The Israeli and Palestinian sides reaffirm their commitment to enhancing their relationship and agree on the need actively to promote economic development in the West Bank and Gaza. In this regard, the parties agree to continue or to reactivate all standing committees established by the Interim Agreement, including the Monitoring and Steering Committee, the Joint Economic Committee (JEC), the Civil Affairs Committee (CAC), the Legal Committee and the Standing Cooperation Committee.

2. The Israeli and Palestinian sides have agreed on arrangements which will permit the timely opening of the Gaza Industrial Estate. They also have concluded a "Protocol Regarding the Establishment and Operation of the International Airport in the Gaza Strip During the Interim Period."

3. Both sides will renew negotiations on the Safe Passage immediately. As regards the southern route, the sides will make best efforts to conclude the agreement within a week of the entry into force of this Memorandum. Operation of the southern route will start as soon as possible thereafter. As regards the northern route, negotiations will continue with the goal of reaching agreement as soon as possible. Implementation will take place expeditiously thereafter.

4. The Israeli and Palestinian sides acknowledge the great importance of the Port of Gaza for the development of the Palestinian economy, and the expansion of Palestinian trade. They commit themselves to proceeding without delay to conclude an agreement to allow the construction and operation of the port in accordance with the prior agreements. The Israeli-Palestinian Committee will reactivate its work immediately with a goal of concluding the protocol within sixty days, which will allow commencement of the construction of the port.

5. The two sides recognize that unresolved legal issues adversely affect the relationship between the two peoples. They therefore will accelerate efforts through the Legal Committee to address outstanding legal issues and to implement solutions to these issues in the shortest possible period. The Palestinian side will provide to the Israeli side copies of all of its laws in effect.

6. The Israeli and Palestinian sides also will launch a strategic economic dialogue to enhance their economic relationship. They will establish within the framework of the JEC an Ad Hoc Committee for this purpose. The committee will review the following four issues: (1) Israeli purchase taxes; (2) cooperation in combating vehicle theft; (3) dealing with unpaid Palestinian debts; and (4) the impact of Israeli standards as barriers to trade and the expansion of A1 and A2 lists. The committee will submit an interim report within three weeks of entry into force of this Memorandum, and within six weeks will submit its conclusions and recommendations to be implemented.

7. The two sides agree on the importance of continued international donor assistance to facilitate implementation by both sides of agreements reached. They also recognize the need for enhanced donor support for economic development in the West Bank and Gaza. They agree to jointly approach the donor community to organize a Ministerial Conference before the end of 1998 to seek pledges of enhanced levels of assistance.



IV. PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS

The two sides will immediately resume permanent status negotiations on an accelerated basis and will make a determined effort to achieve the mutual goal of reaching an agreement by May 4, 1999. The negotiations will be continuous and without interruption. The U.S. has expressed its willingness to facilitate these negotiations.



V. UNILATERAL ACTIONS

Recognizing the necessity to create a positive environment for the negotiations, neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in accordance with the interim Agreement.



This Memorandum will enter into force ten days from the date of signature.

Done at Washington D.C. this 23rd day of October 1998.

[End Memorandum]



ATTACHMENT: TIME LINE

Note: Parenthetical references below are to paragraphs in "The Wye River Memorandum" to which this time line is an integral attachment. Topics not included in the time line follow the schedule provided for in the text of the Memorandum.

1. Upon Entry into Force of the Memorandum:

- Third furher redeployment committee starts (I(B))

- Palestinian security work plan shared with the U.S. (II)(A)(1)(b)

- Full bilateral security cooperation (II(B)(1))

- Interim committees resume and continue; Ad hoc Economic Committee starts (III)

- Accelerated permanent status negotiations start (IV)



2. Entry into Force - Week 2:

- Security work plan implementation begins (II(A)(1)(b)); (II(A)(1)(c)) committee starts

- Illegal weapons framework in place (II(A)(2)(a)); Palestinian implementation report (II(A)(2))(b))

- Anti-incitement committee starts (II(A)(3)(b)); decree issued (II(A)(3)(a))

- PLO executive committee reaffirms Charter letter (II(C)(2))

- Stage 1 of F.R.D. implementation: 2% C to B, 7.1% B to A. Israeli officials acquaint their Palestinian counterparts as required with areas; F.R.D. carried out; report on F.R.D. implementation (I(A))



3. Weeks 2-6

- Palestinian Central Council reaffirms Charter letter (weeks two to four) (II(C)(2))

- PNC and other PLO organizations reaffirm Charter letter (weeks four to six) (II(C)(2))

- Establishment of weapons collection program (II(A)(2)(b)) and collection stage (II(A)(2)(c)); committee starts and reports on activities

- Anti-incitement committee report (II(A)(3)(b))

- Ad Hoc Economic Committee: interim report at week three; final report at week six (III)

- Policemen list (II(C)(1)(a)); Monitoring and Steering Committee review starts (II(C)(1)(c))

- Stage 2 of F.R.D. implementation: 5% C to B. Israeli officials acquaint their Palestinian counterparts as required with areas; F.R.D. carried out; report on F.R.D. implementation (I(A))



4. Weeks 6-12:

- Weapons collection stage (II(A)(2)(b)); (II(A)(2)(C)) committee report on its activities.

- Anti-incitement committee report (II(A)(3)(b))

- Monitoring and Steering Committee briefs U.S. on policeman list (II(C)(1)(c))

- Stage 3 of F.R.D. implementation: 5% C to B, 1% C to A, 7.1% B to A - Israeli officials acquaint Palestinian counterparts as required with areas; F.R.D. carried out; report on F.R.D. implementation (I(A))



5. After Week 12:

Activities described in the Memorandum continue as appropriate and if necessary, including:

- Trilateral security cooperation committee (II(B)(3))

- (II(A)(1)(c)) committee

- (II(A)(1)(e)) committee

- Anti-incitement committee (II(A)(3)(b))

- Third Phase F.R.D. Committee (I(B))

- Interim Committees (III)

- Accelerated permanent status negotiations (IV.

GIVE PEACE A CHANCE

• The Full Text
• U.S. letters to Israel
• Human Rights Watch Commentary
• Nigel Parry's Version
• The CIA's involvement
• Oslo Agreement

The Accompanying Letters to Israel from the U.S.
From the Secretary of State . October 23, 1998

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The United States is pleased to have worked with you in achieving a successful outcome in the negotiations on "the Wye River Memorandum." We believe its parallel phased approach will help provide greater confidence to both sides in the implementation process, since actions in each stage of the time line are to be completed by both sides before moving to the next stage. I can confirm that the United States is prepared to play the role identified for it in the Memorandum.

The United States recognizes the importance of the security provisions of the "Wye River Memorandum" to the State of Israel. In this context, and given the role specified for the United States in the Memorandum, we wish to reiterate our ironclad commitment to Israel's security and to peace, and to stress that Palestinian security undertakings are a critical foundation of the Memorandum.

In this context, we wanted to confirm our understanding of assurances we have received from the Palestinians on several issues that you have indicated are of special concern to Israel. Regarding the Palestinian apprehension of terrorism suspects (II (A) (1) (d)), we have been assured that all the cases which have been identified will be acted upon. With respect to Palestinian decisions regarding the prosecution, punishment or other legal measures that affect the status of individuals suspected of abetting or perpetrating acts of violence or terror, there are procedures in place to prevent unwarranted releases. Furthermore, we will express our opposition to any unwarranted releases of such suspects, and in the event of such a release, we will be prepared to express our position publicly.

Regarding the Palestinian side's program for confiscation and disposition of illegal weapons under paragraph II(A) (2) (b), our assistance to the Palestinian side will help ensure that any retention of weapons is consistent with the relevant Interim Agreement provisions, including ArtIcle IV(5) of Annex I. The US plans to to inform Israel periodically of the progress of our assistance program. Finally, with respect to the Palestinian side's provision of its list of policemen to Israel (II(C) (1) (a)), the US has been assured that it will receive all appropriate information concerning current and former policement as part of our assistance program.

Sincerely

Madeleine K. Albright

From the Embassy of the United States of America Tel Aviv

October 29, 1998

Mr. Dani Naveh

Dear Dani:

I wanted to confirm our policy on the issue of the 3rd phase of further redeployment. In this regard, the statement issued publicly by the State Department on October 27, 1998, is accurate and represents our policy.

Regarding the third further redeployment, the statement said: "during the discussions leading to this agreement, the U.S. made clear to both parties that it will not adopt any position or express any view about the size or the content of the third phase of Israel's further redeployment, which is Israeli responsibility to implement rather than negotiate."

"Under the terms of the memorandum, and Israei-Palestinian committee is being established. NOnetheless we urge the parties not to be distracted form the urgent task of negotiating permanent status arrangements, which are at the heart of the matter and which will determine the future of the area."

"Our own efforts have been and will continue to be dedicated to that vital task."

This public statement by the State Department represents our policy. We will not change it and it will remain our policy in the future.

Sincerely

Edward S. Walker, Jr.

Ambassador

From the Embassy of the United States of America Tel Aviv

October 30, 1998

Dear Dani:

I wanted to confirm our policy on the issues of Reciprocity/Parallelism, Permanent Status Negotiations, and Prisoner Releases. In this regard, the statements issued publicly by the State Department on October 29, 1998, are accurate and represent our policies.

On Reciprocity/Parallelism, the statement said: "resolving the crisis of confidence between Israelis and Palestinians requires each side to fulfill a set of responsibilities based on the concept of reciprocity. I.E., both sides must carry out their respective obligations in accordance with the Wye River Memorandum. These obligations will be implemented or carried out in a parallel phased approach in accordance with the mutually agreed Time Line."

As for Permanent Status Negotiations, the statement said: "the U.S. is highly sensitive to the vital importance of the permanent statue issues to Israel's future. We recognize that the security of the State of Israel and the Israeli public is at stake, and the U.S. commitment to Israel's security remains ironclad."

"We appreciate that if the U.S. is invited by both parties to participate in the permanent status talks, which are to be conducted between Israel and the Palestinians on a bilateral basis, we will do so for the purpose of facilitating the negotiations."

"Only Israel can determine its own security needs and decide what solutions will be satisfactory."

"We also understand that any decision to convene or seek to convene a summit to resolve permanent status issues will need the agreement of both parties."

With regard to the issues of prisoner releases and the question of a "revolving door", the statement said: "we have had discussions with the Palestinians and they have given us a firm commitment that there will be no "revolving door'."

These public statements by the State Department represent our policies: We will not change them and they will remain our policies in the future.

Sincerely

Edward S. Walker, Jr.

Ambassador

From the Embassy of the United States of America Tel Aviv

October 29, 1998

Dear Dani:

I wanted to confirm our policy on the issues of unilateral actions and the CHarter of the PLO. In this regard, the statements issued publicly by the State Department on October 27, 1998, are accurate and represent our policies.

With regard to unilateral declarations or other unilateral actions, the statement said: "as regard to the possibility of a unilateral declaration of statehood or other unilateral actions by either party outside the negotiating process that prejudge or predetermine the outcome of those negotiations, the U.S. opposes and will oppose any such unilateral actions."

"Indeed, the US has maintained for many years that an acceptable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can only be found through negotiations, not through unilateral actions. And as we look to the future, that will remain our policy."

For the present, we are doing all we can to promote permanent status negotiations on an accelerated basis. And we are stressing that those who believe that they can declare unilateral positions or take unilateral acts, when the interim period ends, are courting disaster."

With regard to the PNC, the statement said: "the Wye River Agreement specifies that the

members of the PNC (as well as the members of the PLO Central Council, the Palestinian Council and the Heads of Palestinian Ministries) will be invited to a meeting which President Clinton will attend."

"The purpose of this meeting of the PNC and other PLO organizations is to confirm Chairman Arafat's January 22 letter to PResident Clinton nullifying much of the Charter's provisions that are inconsistent with the PLO's commitments to renounce terror, and to recognize and live in peace with Israel."

"This process of reaffirmation will make clear, once and for all, that the provisions of the PLO Charter that call for the destruction of Israel are null and void."

These public statements by the State Department represent our policies. We will not change them and they will remain our policies in the future.

Sincerely,

Edward S. Walker, Jr.

Ambassador

From the US State Department October 30, 1998

Dear Mr. Naveh,

I wanted to provide further clarification of the understanding of the United States regarding one of the issues addressed in "The Wye River Memorandum."

With respect to the Palestinian side's provision of its list of policemen to Israel (II(C) (1) (a)), the U.S. has been assured that it will receive all appropriate information concerning current and former policemen as part of our assistance program. It is also our understanding that it was agreed by the two sides that the total number of Palestinian Policemen would not exceed 30,000.

Sincerely,

Dennis B. Ross

Special Middle East Coordinator

GIVE PEACE A CHANCE

• The Full Text
• U.S. letters to Israel
• Human Rights Watch Commentary
• Nigel Parry's Version
• The CIA's involvement
• Oslo Agreement

November 1998

Human rights and security concerns are in no way mutually exclusive. Unfortunately, this point appears to have been forgotten during the negotiation of the Wye River Memorandum, signed by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization on October 23. Instead the memorandum presents human rights as an afterthought, without any provisions for monitoring or enforcing human rights standards. Human Rights Watch believes that the U.S., as a party to the memorandum's negotiation and the party designated to monitor its implementation, has a special responsibility to clarify the obligation of all parties to prevent human rights violations. That responsibility must include monitoring of and reporting on all parties' human rights performance.

What the Memorandum Says:

1. Human Rights

The history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is replete with serious human rights violations-including arbitrary arrest, torture, and unfair trials-that the parties have tried to justify by invoking security concerns. Instead of creating strong mechanisms to prevent such violations, many sections of the Wye River Memorandum can be read as encouraging them. Much of the document's language relating to security is broad and categorical, as in the requirement that the Palestinian side pursue a policy of "zero tolerance for terror and violence" and that both sides "take all measures necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism, crime and hostilities." Without a countervailing emphasis on human rights, such language suggests that any and all measures, whether or not they accord with the parties' human rights obligations and the fundamental principles they have pledged to respect, are justified in the fight to eliminate armed attacks against civilians. Those who drafted and signed this new agreement therefore have a responsibility to make clear that meeting legitimate security needs should not be a rationale for violating human rights.

Article II (C) (4) of the memorandum contains the only explicit reference to human rights and the rule of law:

Pursuant to Article XI (1) of Annex I of the [1995 Israeli-Palestinian] Interim Agreement, and without derogating from the above, the Palestinian Police will exercise powers and responsibilities to implement this Memorandum with due regard to internationally accepted norms of human rights and the rule of law, and will be guided by the need to protect the public, respect human dignity, and avoid harassment.

This language is ambiguous and incomplete. First, it applies only to the Palestinian Police, omitting other Palestinian agencies and all Israeli agencies. In addition, the article's inclusion of the phrase "without derogating from the above"-that is, without derogating from the security obligations described in the previous sections of the document-seems to imply that compliance with human rights standards is secondary to security concerns. Any such blanket subordination of human rights to security conflicts with international law norms that clearly indicate the limited circumstances in which departures from human rights standards are allowable. For example, even during "times of public emergency which threaten the life of the nation," Article 4 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) allows only very limited restrictions on rights, and only "to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation." The ICCPR also expressly prohibits any departure, under any circumstances, from certain fundamental guarantees such as the prohibition on torture. Israel and the United States have both ratified the ICCPR, and the Palestinian authorities have indicated their willingness to comply with the treaty while awaiting statehood.

2. Torture and Unfair Trials

Article II (C) (3) sets a twelve-week deadline for responses to requests for "arrest and transfer of suspects and defendants pursuant to Article II (7) of Annex IV" of the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (the Interim Agreement). This clause applies primarily to transfer requests made by Israel because the Interim Agreement only allows the transfer of non-Israelis to Palestinian custody. Although press reports have indicated that Israel dropped its request for the transfer of some Palestinian suspects in exchange for the Palestinian Authority agreeing to bring them to trial, this is not reflected in the language of the memorandum. Since the Interim Agreement requires the parties to "effect the arrest and transfer" upon receipt of a request, Article II (C) (3) increases the likelihood that Palestinian suspects will be subject to arbitrary arrest, torture, and summary trials.

Despite the presence of a human rights clause in Article XI (1) of Annex I of the Interim Agreement, Human Rights Watch and other human rights organizations have extensive documentation of the use of torture during interrogation and of unfair trials in both Israel and under the Palestinian Authority since the signing of that agreement. In May and July the treaty monitoring bodies of the Convention against Torture and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights found Israel to violate those treaties' prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, based on its use of torture during interrogation and its use of administrative detention and detention by military order, practices which lacked provisions for effective judicial review. Human Rights Watch believes that Article II (C) (3) may lead to the transfer of detainees to a state where they risk torture, as well as possibly encouraging the Palestinian Authority to engage in arbitrary arrests, arbitrary detentions, and unfair trials.

3. Freedom of Expression

Article II (A) (3) states that "the Palestinian side will issue a decree prohibiting all forms of incitement to violence or terror, and establishing mechanisms for acting systematically against all expressions or threats of violence or terror." It also creates an U.S.-Palestinian-Israeli committee, staffed by media specialists, law enforcement representatives, educational specialists, and current or former elected officials. This committee is to "monitor cases of possible incitement to violence or terror and make recommendations and reports on how to prevent such incitement."

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights places strict limits on the range of permissible interference with the rights it guarantees. While Article 20 of the ICCPR requires states to prohibit incitement to violence, such prohibitions must be narrowly tailored in light of the fundamental right to free expression protected in Article 19, which specifies that restrictions on the right to freedom of expression are only allowed in pursuit of a limited set of goals, and only when such restrictions are necessary for ensuring their achievement. The United Nations Human Rights Committee, which monitors the ICCPR, has further emphasized that such restrictions "may not put in jeopardy the right itself."

Human Rights Watch and other human rights organizations have documented many Palestinian Authority violations of press freedom and freedom of expression, including the closure of media outlets and the arrest of journalists and writers who have published stories critical of the Palestinian Authority. We are concerned that the vague language of "prohibiting all forms of incitement" may become an excuse for further violations of the right to legitimate political expression. Already freedom of expression violations have increased sharply since the signing of the Wye River Memorandum.

4. The Role of the CIA

The Wye River Memorandum sets up U.S.-Palestinian and U.S.-Palestinian-Israeli committees to monitor implementation, including committees that "monitor cases of possible incitement" and "review and evaluate information pertinent to the decisions on prosecution, punishment or other legal measures which affect the status of individuals suspected of abetting or perpetrating acts of violence and terror." Officials of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) will represent the U.S. on these committees. The CIA has in the past frequently tolerated gross human rights violations by security forces and groups it monitored or aided, as in Honduras, and has itself been implicated in human rights violations, most recently in Haiti.

Human Rights Watch strongly recommends that the mandate of committees set up to monitor implementation of the memorandum includes monitoring of human rights violations by all sides. U.S. representation should not be limited to CIA personnel, and all U.S. representatives should have training in monitoring human rights violations. U.S. committee members should be required to report all human rights violations to the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, and this information should be made public and included in the Department of State's annual country reports on human rights.

Recommendations for Implementation:

Israeli and Palestinian security forces have a responsibility to protect the public, and human rights standards should not be used to excuse negligence or lack of political will in discharging this responsibility. However, the main danger is not excessive concern for human rights and rule of law by security forces and political leaders, but the opposite: a sense of dispensation from human rights norms in implementing "all measures necessary" to prevent acts of violence.

Human Rights Watch calls upon all parties named in the Wye River Memorandum to:

Clarify their understanding that the security obligations outlined in the memorandum must be met in a manner that is consistent with international human rights standards, and that the language of Article II (C) (4) is to be read as supplementary to Article XI(1) of Annex I of the Interim Agreement, which acknowledges the respect due international human rights standards in the exercise of both Israel and Palestinian responsibilities.

Clarify their understanding that Article II (A) (3)'s requirement to prohibit "all forms of incitement to violence or terror" and to take actions "against all expressions or threats of violence or terror" must be implemented in accordance with the norms of international human rights law, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Take all possible steps to ensure that individuals detained for security reasons are not subject to torture or ill-treatment. These steps should include monitoring the conditions of the detainees' interrogation and detention. In the event that such persons are transferred by either Israel or the Palestinian Authority, all parties should seek assurances that the government receiving the suspect will honor the prohibition in international human rights law against returning a person to a place where there are substantial grounds for believing he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.

Human Rights Watch calls on the United States to:

Ensure that U.S. representatives monitoring the memorandum's implementation also monitor human rights violations by all sides. All such information should be forwarded on a regular basis to the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, and should be made public and included in the Department of State's annual country reports on human rights.

Ensure that at least one of the U.S. representatives on the Trilateral Committee, described in paragraph II (A) (3) (b), has a strong background in human rights law and experience in defending freedom of expression and association.

• The Full Text
• U.S. letters to Israel
• Human Rights Watch Commentary
• Nigel Parry's Version
• The CIA's involvement
• Oslo Agreement

1) We, the Palestinian National Municipality, agree to arrest, torture and imprison our own people if they disagree with any aspects of our capitulation to the Israeli side. We will do this in exchange for a further one percent of land to be passed over to our control. The remaining twelve percent will be added to the areas that we get cut off from on a regular basis every time Israel decides to close the roads betweeen our towns in the territories. Of this total 13 percent, we have agreed that 3 percent of it will be nature reserve land that we cannot build on, which will do nothing to solve the problem of overcrowding in Palestinian cities.

We will also be allowed finally to open an airport, again a little tardy and already agreed upon, and naturally under soverign Israeli control. Israel has also kindly allowed us to open an industrial park on our own land in Gaza. We acknowledge that the opening of a sea port, which would open the doors to real trade revenue for the Palestinians, is subject to further negotiations during the next two months, which will never be concluded as riots/acts of terrorism that breaks out as a response to this agreement will give the Israelis an excuse to delay this step yet again.

2) We, the Israeli Government, agree to begin to negotiate the opening of a safe passage route which we had already concluded an agreement on opening five years ago.

At some unspecified point in the future, we will give the Palestinian side another 14.2 percent of land near the existing Area A towns that we cannot really geographically police anyway. Where policing is needed in these areas, we are confident that the Palestinians will do it for us.

After that, we'll perhaps talk some more about the return of the really important land, naturally excluding anything fertile or over an aquifer.

We emphasise once again the importance of solving Palestinian economic problems, as we firmly believe that it is this, not our institutionalised theft of land and repression of a whole people for half a century, that is really the root of Palestinian discontent.

We will also gladly mention to the donors that they should give the Palestinians more money, which is a much easier question for us to address than why we are not offering reparations to the Palestinian people for fifty years of military occupation.

3) We, the American Rulers of the World, out of our desire to see peace, justice and human rights prevail in Palestine, and out of our electorial obligations to the pro-Israel lobby in Washington, have agreed to lend the Palestinians the expert monitoring services of the Central Intellegence Agency, known and respected worldwide for its committment to peace, justice and human rights.

We are particularly grateful to the Palestinian Authority for generously compromising once again, in order to afford us the opportunity to claim a media victory that will get the attention away from the President and his intern problems.

4) We, the World Community, pretty much dependent on the Americans for pretty much everything these days, once again clap and praise the leaders of all three countries for reaching an agreement that means no change in the status quo for the still unresolved Palestinian Question.

Nigel Parry

GIVE PEACE A CHANCE

• The Full Text
• U.S. letters to Israel
• Human Rights Watch Commentary
• Nigel Parry's Version
• The CIA's involvement
• Oslo Agreement

Global Intelligence Update From Stratfor Red Alert
October 26, 1998

U.S.-Israeli Intel Cooperation at Heart of Washington Accords On October 5, 1998, the Global Intelligence Update contained the following: "Israel cannot decide between the Rabin or the Netanyahu courses of action, and is therefore following both poorly. In a sense, either strategy works, where a compromise between the two is the worst strategy of all." On October 23, 1998, Israel and Palestine reached what will be known as the Washington Accords, confirming this analysis. Netanyahu, in essence, endorsed the Oslo Accords while making it clear that he did not intend to follow their logic. He was accompanied by Ariel Sharon, who simultaneously praised the accords while refusing to commit himself to voting for them. A dying King Hussein of Jordan looked on benignly while Yasir Arafat signed the agreement. Arafat then left the meetings declaring that a Palestinian state, an idea loathed even more by Hussein than Sharon, would be declared very shortly. And the CIA found itself in the strange position of having to guarantee Yasir Arafat's behavior to the Israelis. It was a strange culmination to nine days of theatrics.

To begin with, the Washington Accords are the Oslo Accords resurrected. Let there be no mistake about that. The Palestinian National Authority will now be given control over a total of about 40 percent of the West Bank, while Israel will retain control over the Jordan River line and key security infrastructure, transport, and communications links. Beyond that, as with Oslo, nothing is clear. The Palestinians see this as culminating in a Palestinian state, while the Israelis merely see the possibility of further transfers of control, depending on Israeli evaluation of Palestinian behavior. Some of the specifics have changed, but the general principle of Oslo has been affirmed: Israel is prepared to transfer land to PNA control if the Palestinians are prepared to commit themselves to fighting against Palestinian terrorism within Israel proper. As with Oslo, everyone is free to interpret the rest as they wish.

There is only one truly important distinction. Netanyahu and Sharon negotiated this agreement rather then by Rabin and Peres. That makes a great deal of difference. Rabin and Peres fell for two reasons. First, and this is particularly true of Peres, their public presentation of the Oslo Accords was too sweeping and too hopeful for the Israeli public. Peres' enthusiasm for Oslo carried him away, finding him admitting things semi-publicly and semi-officially that frightened the badly divided Israeli public. Because of the sense that Peres had an inferior grasp of Israeli security needs, Israeli Oslo-anxiety increased exponentially as time went on. Once Rabin was assassinated, deep concerns about Peres' ability to protect Israeli interests defeated him. The elections were less about Oslo than about Peres' ability to police Oslo.

Two men who cannot be accused of indifference to security issues negotiated these accords. The very presence of Sharon at the table reassures the majority of the Israeli right. Moreover, as bitter as it is, the Israeli left cannot help but endorse the settlement. Thus, the first polls taken in Israel after the announcement of the agreement show that about three-quarters of the Israeli electorate endorse the accords. It is difficult to imagine an evolution in which Netanyahu will not be able to either hold his cabinet together or, if needed, hold an election in which a pro-settlement coalition will not emerge.

The condition on the Palestinian side is similar to that after the Oslo Accords. There is a deep sense of unease at what Arafat brought back. The accord promises increased power for Arafat's political apparatus, including an opportunity for a devastating crackdown on his Palestinian opponents. This is something Arafat wants to do and needs to do anyway. Now he can do it under the cover of the Washington Accords. Arafat has apparently already initiated actions by his intelligence and security apparatus, who assaulted a headquarters of the Fatah faction within hours of the signing. In follow-on demonstrations, a Palestinian youth was badly wounded by gunfire from Palestinian National Authority security personnel.

Arafat has seen his authority vigorously attacked by Palestinian factions who see him as a puppet in Israeli hands. After Oslo, they accused him of both selling out the Palestinian vision of an independent state and abandoning the struggle for the liberation of Palestine proper. He used his security apparatus fairly ruthlessly to maintain his power and was actually weakened when Netanyahu's rejection of Oslo forced him to limit his suppression of opponents. It is therefore not accidental that Arafat immediately claimed that the accords pave the way very quickly to a Palestinian state. By making this assertion, Arafat plausibly reclaims the mantle of Palestinian nationalism, portraying his critics as maximalists who would undermine the triumph that was near at hand. Thus, the accords both require and free Arafat to crack down on Hamas and the rest of his opponents.

From the Israeli side, this was the heart of the agreement. Control over land on the West Bank is meaningless. The Israelis would just as soon be rid of security responsibilities in the region so long as they retain strategic control of the area. The Israelis were trading a trivial matter for a matter of grave importance: anti-terrorist cooperation. On the other hand, Arafat was being forced to do what he badly wanted to do anyway. So we have a situation in which the Israelis have given away control over territory they neither need nor want. In exchange, Arafat has agreed to do something that Arafat wants to do anyway. Why in the world did this take nine days to negotiate.

As always, there was a deeper issue: the United States. As we said on October 5, Israel has national security responsibilities that outstrip its industrial plant. It must have an outside source of military hardware in order to implement its national strategy. This supplier has varied over time but since 1967 it has been the United States. Israel is constantly trying to increase U.S. dependency on Israel in order to strengthen Israeli access to U.S. weaponry. Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. strategic dependence on Israel has declined as U.S. strategic exposure has declined. Israel has felt extremely exposed during this period.

Since objective U.S. dependency on Israel has declined, Israel has tried to increase subjective dependency. It has tried hard to convince the United States that it has a fundamental interest in a stable Middle East. In fact, everyone in the region has worked very hard to convince the United States that it should care what happens in the region. This has been difficult to do, since, in fact, the future of the region is not really all that important to the United States. But old habits die hard. The Cold War era interest in the region has remained in place. Everyone, but particularly the Israelis, have tried to harden this mild sentiment into firm policy. Israel has been helped by Bill Clinton's problems. Clinton does have a political interest in a Middle East settlement, simply in the sense that he needs every foreign policy triumph he can get prior to the elections and impeachment hearings. Netanyahu, Arafat, Hussein, and everyone not in attendance, such as Mubarak and Assad, used Clinton's strong interest to generate a U.S. national interest. An Israeli-Palestinian agreement could have happened in hours. Getting the United States to guarantee the agreements took nine days. It was nine days in which Netanyahu worked very hard to convince the Americans that he didn't want an agreement.

For Netanyahu it was important to behave as if making this agreement were a major concession, not only to the Palestinians, but to the United States as well. Since the territorial concessions being made were of little consequence, and Netanyahu could not claim major political exposure at home, it was extremely important to make the case that the settlement posed a major threat to Israel. Hence the emphasis on Arafat's willingness to control extremists. However, since Arafat was quite happy to crack down, Netanyahu badly needed another angle. The solution was easy: how could Netanyahu trust Arafat's commitment to controlling terrorism, given his record? This became the key "stumbling block."

Netanyahyu, of course, knew the answer to his own question: Arafat's own political interests dictated a crackdown on Hamas and the others. But Netanyahu carefully posed the question in such a way that it could not be solved simply within the Israeli- Palestinian context. Enter the United States as guarantor of the agreement, in the same sense that U.S. forces in the Sinai guarantee the Camp David accords, but with a wildly different twist. The Israelis charge that Arafat's intelligence people know about terrorist attacks on Israel and do nothing about them. Arafat denies this. There is one party that knows precisely what Arafat knows, because it overhears all of his telephone conversations, reads his faxes and email, and has penetrated his organization -- the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency or, more precisely, the U.S. intelligence community including the NSA, NRO, DIA and everyone else.

Netanyahu maneuvered the talks so that it was the United States who really wanted an agreement. It then followed that if the United States wanted a settlement, it would have to be willing to police it by using the Central Intelligence Agency to guarantee the cooperation of the Palestinians. This of course raised an interesting question. If the CIA pretty much knows everything the Palestinians know, a prerequisite assumption for this deal to work, why didn't the CIA pass information on to the Israelis directly, warning them of action. Better still, why doesn't the CIA do something about terrorist actions. And that takes us to the heart of the matter.

Israel is badly in need of U.S. intelligence cooperation. Just as its national security apparatus is outstripped by its national security requirements, so too its intelligence apparatus is outstripped by its intelligence requirements. Israeli-U.S. intelligence cooperation has been strained over the years by events like the Pollard affair, by strengthening U.S. ties with Arab leaders like Arafat, and a general divergence of Israeli- U.S. interests. It is clear that Israel feels that the CIA has sufficiently penetrated the Palestinians that it knows not only what actions are planned, but also knows what Arafat knows. It is also clear that Israel feels that the United States has not passed this information on to Mossad in a timely fashion. By claiming that it could not rely on Arafat's own intelligence sharing with Israel, or on the PNA's willingness to protect Israel from terrorists, Netanyahu maneuvered the United States into an intelligence sharing agreement guaranteed by an international agreement. Not bad for nine days of meetings!

From Netanyahu's perspective, the key was to be placed in a position in which his agreements with Arafat were seen by the United States as an Israeli concession to the Americans. Once that happened, everything followed naturally. The least the United States could do in return was to guarantee Palestinian compliance with the agreements. The only way for that to work was an enhanced intelligence sharing regime. Not surprisingly or incidentally, part of the price Israel asked for its agreement was the release of Jonathan Pollard from a U.S. prison and of an Israeli intelligence agent being held by the Egyptians. The heart of the Washington accords was a reconciliation between the American and Israeli intelligence communities. What could be more natural than to have one of the major bones of contention dividing the two countries dealt with. In fact, Netanyahu thought he had an agreement in place with Clinton. He may have had. But in the light of day, Clinton realized that the outright release of Pollard would not only have grave political consequences in the United States, but should be used as a stick to guarantee Netanyahu's own behavior in the coming weeks.

The essence of the Washington Accords, therefore, has less to do with land or with Arafat's commitment to anti-terrorist actions than it has to do with U.S.-Israeli intelligence cooperation. That is what the Israelis really brought away from these meetings, and it is an important prize indeed. With U.S. guarantees of monitoring Arafat's compliance, Israel is in a position to access U.S. intelligence sources and methods in the region as it has not had in many years, perhaps since the Pollard fiasco broke.

The United States has come out of these talks with a massive burden. An intelligence failure on the part of the United States, and such failures are inevitable, will now allow the Israelis to cast the Americans as colluding with the Palestinians, whose intelligence is also subject to breakdown. Each terrorist bombing in Jerusalem will now become a bill the Israelis can present to the Americans. The U.S. will be constantly trying to prove its good will to the Israelis, as part of the Washington Accords, a matter of obligation. In addition, Arafat is now publicly labeled a CIA agent, as he publicly acknowledges that not only has the CIA completely penetrated his apparatus, but that the Washington Accords make his acquiescence to this regime a necessity.

So Israel leaves Washington with a major victory. But it is the type of victory Israel has been winning for years without really solving its fundamental problem. Israel remains dependent on the United States for its strategic interests and the U.S. commitment to Israel is more subjective than objective, more a matter of passing atmospherics than of fundamental national interest. Israel's ability to manipulate the United States for short-term gain does not translate into a sound foreign policy. Israel needs Arafat to be credible in the Arab world, but this agreement does not do that. Israel needs a national security problem congruent with its capabilities but this agreement does not bring Israel closer to it.

Like Oslo, Washington moved things forward without defining a solution. Unlike Oslo, it rests on firm political ground in Israel, and therefore will survive. But the Washington Accords have created a time-bomb in U.S.-Israeli relations. Israel now has an intelligence sharing agreement it can manipulate to its advantage. However, every manipulative act increases the objective divergence of U.S.-Israeli interests and that is the real danger embedded in these accords. The U.S. is now too deeply involved in events no one can control. The possibilities of friction between Israel and the United States are multiplied enormously by this agreement. But that is at the heart of Israel's strategic dilemma.

Stratfor