April 1999

I have been asked to speak about the current situation of the Palestinian Territories including East Jerusalem. This is, of course, a difficult task and cannot be comprehensive. My remarks are based on my own subjective opinion of what I observe, experience and believe to be true. I will begin this presentation with a visual tour through a slide presentation that I have prepared. The show begins with an aerial flight above the Jerusalem area, mainly aimed at showing the latest developments of the Israeli settlements and the massive building that has taken place in Jerusalem, both on the Israeli side as well as on the Palestinian side. The second part of the presentation focuses on the Bethlehem and Ramallah areas from slides taken last week. These slides aim to present a very complex picture, of development - both positive and negative, of the birth of a Palestinian state with its government institutions, and of obvious and significant issues left calling for attention and answers for their problems.

The general title for this session is "The status of the peace process at the end of the interim period and efforts towards the realization by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights". The response to this title is rather simple: the peace process is frozen, and while great progress has been made thus far towards achieving the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, as one could see from the slides, further progress is still a very open question. My own belief is that further progress is entirely dependent on the outcome of the Israeli elections. If Binyamin Netanyahu is re-elected, and assuming that he does not go through a political metamorphoses, I believe that there will be no real progress towards a final status agreement. Negotiations may begin, however, there is little chance or hope that a Netanyahu government will be able to deliver even the minimum political requirements to the Palestinians that would be acceptable as a final status peace agreement. I say this based on the many tens of hours I have spent in discussions with senior members of the Likud and close advisors Netanyahu. While today, most senior members of the Likud have come to terms with the eventuality of a Palestinian state, Netanyahu holds firm to his ideological opposition to Palestinian sovereignty. Perhaps it is worthwhile to briefly examine the reasons Netanyahu mentions base his objections to Palestinian statehood.

Netanyahu's main argument states that a Palestinian state is unacceptable to it because as an independent state it would possess full sovereignty that would endanger the existence of Israel. Netanyahu substantiates his claim by pointing to four main issues that would, according to him, endanger Israel. These are:

1. A sovereign state has the right to establish a full offensive fighting force including artillery, air force, naval forces, etc. The sovereign state would have control over its airspace and its air force could easily violate Israel's territory. Artillery forces facing Israel could easily attack any part of Israel. A sovereign state could establish a military industrial complex which could produce military hardware including strategic missiles, katyusha rockets, scud missiles, other conventional and non-conventional lethal weapons. Even the unlimited production of "soft" hardware - bullets, grenades, etc. poses a lethal threat to Israel. The borders proposed by the Palestinians are also unacceptable to Israel because of clear strategic concerns (the narrow neck in the central part of the country) and because of the settlement blocs that run alongside of the old "green line".
2. A sovereign Palestinian state would have full control over its own borders - in particular concern is the control of immigration policies and of the control of goods entering the Palestinian state. With regard to immigration, potentially millions of Palestinian refugees could be allowed by the Palestinian state to freely enter its territories. The borders between Israel and Palestine are completely permeable which would essentially mean a possible uncontrolled return of hundreds and thousands and perhaps more Palestinians into Israel proper. This is viewed as a direct threat to Israel both demographically and economically.

   Furthermore, Netanyahu believes that even if the borders were not permeable, the uncontrolled return of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians to the Palestinian state would place unbearable economic pressures on the Palestinian state which would endanger its stability. The Palestinian state would not be capable of providing adequate housing or employment for all of the returnees and therefore the potential of those returnees joining the forces of the opposition to peace is great and poses a direct threat both to Israel and to the Palestinian state.

   The Palestinian state would have full control of its borders. These borders unsupervised by Israel could serve as a gateway for the entry of military hardware and goods for the construction of explosives and weapons. Israel has little if no confidence in the capability of the Palestinian government to control or prevent the entrance of weapons into its territories. In Israel's view, the Palestinian Authority has a very low performance record on security matters. Additionally, there is little belief in Israel with regard to the political will of the Palestinian government to limit the quantity or quality of weapons in the territories, both those held by private citizens, radical militia or by the Palestinian forces themselves.

3. An independent Palestinian state would be legally allowed to enter into military defense pacts and other alignments with third parties that do not have peace with Israel. Such a potential alliance with Iraq or Iran could pose real potential threats to Israel. If for example the Hashemite regime in Jordan were to fall and if the Palestinian state concluded a defense pact with Iraq, a new regime in Jordan could invite Iraq to send forces to Jordan and from there to the West Bank. Pacts between the Palestinian state and Iran could support radical Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups in Lebanon, Jordan, the West Bank or Gaza.
4. A independent Palestinian state would have the full rights to control all of the natural resources of its territory - mainly water resources. Uncontrolled Palestinian pumping of water from the mountain aquifer could seriously threaten Israel water rights and reserves. Additionally, uncontrolled and untreated sewage seeps into the aquifer and endangers the water resources. The Palestinian authority thus far has a very poor record in preserving water resources and in developing sewage treatment facilities. It is believed in Israel the in several cases the Palestinian Authority has deliberately polluted water resources by failing to link existing sewage projects to existing Israeli treatment facilities.

These are the positions held by Netanyahu. Should he be re-elected, even if there is a national-unity government including Barak and Mordechai, Netanyahu will maintain full control over the negotiations with the Palestinians. It is most probable that the newly elected MK Danny Naveh will also be given a role in those negotiations.

If, on the other hand, Barak or Mordechai is elected as the next Prime Minister, I believe that we should expect that final status negotiations will commence almost immediately. I believe that those negotiations will move very rapidly. The position taken by the US will be one supporting speedy negotiations as President Clinton will be seafor a legacy bigger than Monica and Kosovo to be remembered for. The US will be very generous to both the Palestinians and the Israelis in the efforts to resolve difficult questions.

Without any intention of being patronizing and out of deep concern for the outcome of negotiations, I can say that the Palestinians must be better prepared for those negotiations than they have proven to be in the past. In my view, there was a marked improvement in Palestinian negotiating performance, at Wye Plantation, however, this might be a reflection of the amateurish performance by Netanyahu and his team at Wye.

Currently, from what I have been able to learn, the Palestinians are not yet prepared for final status negotiations. There must be a Palestinian-international effort to enlist the top political and legal minds around the world and locally to prepare the best possible negotiating strategy. This work must be backed up by and supported by top professional experts on a broad range of technical questions.

It is clear that these negotiations are the ones that really count. The Palestinians must put themselves in a position where they can off-set the lack of balance in the negotiations. The Israelis hold most of the assets that the Palestinians are seeking. The Palestinians must devise a strategy and tactics that create a more leveled playing field. What is necessary to achieve this? Here are a few suggestions:

• The Palestinians must be able to correctly and accurately anticipate what the Israeli positions will be in advance of the negotiations. This must be detailed and well thought out so as to analyze what are the true Israeli red lines in the talks. There must be a well understood analysis of the Israeli strategy and the reasons behind that strategy.
• The Palestinians should be prepare to present their program and force the Israelis to respond, rather than the other way around. Preparing documents in advance of talks creates a situation whereby the Palestinians set the agenda.
• When the Israeli present documents, the Palestinians should not respond to the document directly. The Palestinians should prepare lists of questions for the Israelis to answer. The questions should not be directly related to the Israeli document, but should be questions of principles. The idea is to keep control of the talks and the agenda.
• Palestinian presentations and documents should always stress a clear awareness and a readiness to take into account "Israel's legitimate security concerns". This will off-set the Israel tendency to view every issue in very narrow terms that they refer to as matter of "security". This is not to suggest that the Palestinians should ignore their own legitimate security terms.
• The Palestinians should always demand within the agreements, contingencies for partial or non-implementation on the part of the Israelis. This should include contingencies for not meeting time tables. Contingencies are both procedural and economic and should be backed up by firm guarantees from the United States.
• The Palestinians should know well in advance of negotiations what their own "red lines" are. These should be written down and get as a kind of "Bible" for negotiations. Any straying away or variance from that Bible should demand very good explanations amongst the members of the negotiating team.

I would further suggest that the Palestinians and the Israelis begin a program of "democratizing the negotiating process". The idea is to get as many Israelis and Palestinians possible directly involved in determining the kind of settlement that would be acceptable to them. This should also involve using the press in order to insure the widest possible exposure of the discussions taking place. The purpose should be to begin to get common people involved in the formulation of solutions to the various open questions.

The best example of this kind is what has been conducted in Northern Ireland for the past years. There is a clear and defined role that the Northern Ireland public took and is taking in the formulation of the solutions to the problems there. There is very little tradition and experience in Palestine in getting the general public to take part in the formulation of the most crucial aspects of public policy that directly effect their lives.

By adopting the concept of the "town meeting" used in participatory democratic societies, local residents will have the opportunity to formulate their own opinions and to voice those opinions to public leaders. The interaction with public figures is aimed at both providing a direct mechanism for the public leaders and elected officials to hear the public as well as helping the public to formulate political options that are realistic. I would also recommend integrating people from the other side in some of these town meetings in order to allow the public to have a greater understanding of the issue and its complexities as seen from the other side.

Real democracy means real involvement in the formulation of public policy. Getting your voice heard can be done in more ways than in demonstrations and protests. The democratization of the peace process means taking a pro-active and constructive approach so that people will be involved in formulating their opinion and in voicing it.

Lastly I would like to speak about one more internal Palestinian issue which is relevant not only to Palestinians, but also to those of us who wish to live with the Palestinians in peace. Palestinian Democracy. I believe that truly democratic nations are less likely to support military options to conflict before all other options have been exhaustively pursued. Democratically elected leaders will be very cautious before sending their armies into battle unless absolutely necessary for the protection of vital national interests. Autocrats and dictators, on the other hand, will use military options as a means of strengthening their own reign and control of national resources. Military options undertaken by autocrats usually only concern the interests of the regime and not of the nation. Therefore, true peace between Israel and Palestine which will undoubtedly include undertaking serious security and strategic risks for Israel will be only really possible once the Palestinians have created a vibrant democracy.

The development and perpetuation of a less than democratic Palestinian government, in which one person is the final reference for all decision making, and a regime without proper accountability - financial and political and enough transparency, do not create confidence necessary to take those risks which include the transference of significant territories to Palestinian sovereign control.

Positive steps in the strengthening Palestinian democracy should be undertaken to provide it with a strong and solid basis. This should include:

1. Completing the legislation of democratic Basic Laws setting the independence of the branches of government and providing for sufficient checks and balances including proper and defined limitations of each branch including the executive branch.
2. The opening of the Legislative Council to the public through the use of the media.
3. Guaranteeing basic human and civil rights through legislation including the freedom of the press.

Furthermore, steps should be taken to liberalize and democratize the Palestinian economy, including the prevention of monopolies controlled by the Palestinian Authority and laws and regulations which would open the Palestinian economy to cooperation with Israel.

I would like to end with a few words of trepidation. We have not yet seen the end of violence. If Netanyahu is re-elected violence will most likely take the form of armed conflict between the IDF and the Palestinian police/military forces. This might happen after the Palestinians declare their independence assuming negotiations do not succeed or at another time that Israel, under Netanyahu will wish to "prove" to the world that the Palestinians are not truly interested in peace. An Israeli provocation, such as with the Jerusalem tunnel in September 1996 could ela violent Palestinian response, either controlled or spontaneous.

If Barak or Mordechai is elected and the negotiations on final status advance, we should all brace ourselves for a wave of terrorism initiated and undertaken by the extremists from both societies who will seek to de-rail the peace process as they had done in the past. Those of us, in both societies and within the international community who are committed to peace must be prepared to face this violence. If the violence is of the nature of military forces facing each other, than we must be prepared to mobilize the Israeli and Palestinian masses in the peace camp to physically stand between the forces. If the violence is undertaken by terrorists, be they Israeli or Palestinian, we must not allow our leaders to surrender to violence. Negotiations must continue and progress under all circumstances. The peace camps in both societies must join together to prevent the possibility that peace will evade us. Second chances don't come easily.

The road ahead is not an easy one. The outcome of the Israeli elections will determine if peace will truly emerge in the coming two-years. Even if the Israeli government and the PLO do reach a peace agreement, this will not be sufficient for creating peace. Peace will develop through a tri-lateral approach - peace agreements at the official level, real economic development that will create jobs, investments and real prosperity, and lastly, real people-to-people contacts between Palestinians and Israelis at all levels, but most importantly through the educational systems of both sides. Peace will be real when the word "normalization" is no longer a dirty word. Perhaps when peace is real, there will also not be a need for convening more conferences such as this one, and we can then come to Namibia for the appreciation of the beautiful nature of this country.

Gershon Baskin

Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information