Whether or not the Oslo accord is still valid on May 5, 1999 is a legitimate question for which answers must be provided. Does the Palestinian Authority have legal authority to rule after the termination of the five year interim period? Will the Palestinian Legislative Council continue to have any powers on the day after May 4, 1999. The authors of Oslo clearly did not intend there to be a legal void, believing that final status arrangements would come into place by that time. The question of what happens on "the day after" must be addressed by the legal and political communities on both sides and within international bodies.

Whether or not Yasser Arafat has the legal right to declare independence unilaterally at the termination of the interim period, just as David Ben Gurion declared independence unilaterally at the termination of the British mandate, is likely to be more of a political argument than a legal argument. The repercussions of such an act will be determined primarily by the circumstances that surround the declaration. From the point of view of peacemaking, if the Palestinians do declare independence unilaterally, it is essential that they do it in such as way that every avenue to avoid violence and confrontation is pursued.

This paper would like to put forth three strategic alternatives that are available to the Palestinians (and the international community) with regard to a unilateral Declaration of independence (UDI). Two of the strategies are more likely to produce positive and non-violent outcomes, while the third option is one that evokes violence and is perhaps the most dramatic of the alternatives and therefore, the one that seems most likely to be followed at this stage. The authors of this paper clearly support options #2 and #3 and calls upon the Palestinian Authority and the international community to work together to support these options.

Alternative #1 -UDI and Confrontation

This option would work like this: After months of low level violence, demonstrations, intifadaesque scenes on cable television networks of Israeli soldiers chasing Palestinians youngsters with stones and molotov cocktails, while Palestinian police standby and watch the events take place, on the eve of May 5, 1999, President Arafat declares an emergency meeting of the national authority together with the Executive Council, the Fatah Central Council and the Fatah Revolutionary Council. The public figures listen to a long speech which is broadcasted on Palestinian Television and radio in which President Arafat recalls the Palestinian strategic decision to make peace with Israel at Oslo, but the Israelis have chosen settlements and not peace. The Palestinians honored their commitments undertaken in all the agreements and even the Americans support the Palestinian position. But the Israeli government of Netanayhu, facing a fierce election battle has chosen to bolster its position in the polls by derailing the peace process, building new settlements, confiscating more land, bulldozing houses, and refusing to release Palestinian political prisoners. Even the Labour party is declaring that the Palestinians do not have the right to determine the own future and declare independence.

Arafat will call upon the collective memory of the Palestinian people to recall the hundred years of struggle and suffering and the heroic Palestinian leadership that has led them out of the darkness into a new era of statehood. In a dramatic rereading of the Declaration of Independence from November 1988, Arafat will announce the formal birth of the Palestinian state. Arafat will declare that the Palestinian Army and security forces or already on standby to defend the sovereign integrity of the Palestinian state. Arafat will declare that the borders of the State of Palestine are the borders of June 4, 1967, e.g. All of the West Bank and Gaza and East Jerusalem. Arafat will declare East Jerusalem the capital of Palestine. Furthermore, Arafat will declare that all of the Israeli settlers in Palestine are violating the sovereign integrity of Palestine and have one of two choice before them: (1) vacate the settlements and reinstate the land to the State of Palestine; or (2) declare loyalty to the Palestinian state, agree to live under Palestinian sovereignty and to open their communities to Palestinians who wish to purchase homes in the settlements. All settlers will be called upon to apply for a Palestinian identity card and passport. Failure to adhere to Palestinian laws will result in detention and even confiscation of their property by the State.

While Arafat is speaking, Palestinian road blocks will be set up throughout the new State, aimed primarily at stopping Israeli vehicles from using Palestinian roads. Palestinian youth who have participated in paramilitary training since last summer will be enlisting public support in every village, town, city and refugee camp throughout Palestine, first to "celebrate" the declaration in the streets and to confront the expected Israeli attack.

Immediately following the Declaration, the Government of Israel, convening in special emergency session, will send out the IDF to prevent the Palestinian army from taking effective control of any territory outside of area "A". Gaza will immediately be closed. Should confrontations involve the use of live weapons, the IDF commanders have orders to enter area "A" with tanks and if need be, to take control of the Palestinian cities.

At the same time, both the Israelis and Palestinians will be on the phone with foreign leaders, President Clinton, Prime Minister Blair, Shroeder, and others aimed at convincing them that the other side is the aggressor. Reports of violence will be showering in from CNN and the BBC. Palestinian casualties will rise into the hundreds, Israeli casualties will be less but nonetheless, painful. President Arafat will call upon Kofi Annan to send UN troops immediately to defend the Palestinian people.

Should the events unfold more-or-less as described above, the chance of the Palestinians gaining European recognition their new state will be quite slim. Europe, or most of Europe will be persuaded by the Israelis and the Americans that the Palestinians are in violation of the Oslo Agreement and while Israel exaggerated in its use of force, the Palestinians were clearly aggressors. Israel will come under international sanction for re-occupying Palestinian areas and will be called upon to withdraw immediately from those territories. After several weeks of violence, the Americans will relaunch a new shuttle diplomacy aimed at de-escalating the situation. Final status negotiations will not be on the agenda for quite some time...

Alternative #2 - Postponing UDI for One Year

International and Israeli pressure coupled with pressure from the peace camp in Israel will convince Arafat that UDI on May 5, 1999 would be counter productive to the Palestinian struggle and would only result in violence and additional suffering for the Palestinian masses. Israel will be in the midst of a tough election campaign and Palestinian UDI will only serve the Israel right-wing, something that Arafat is not interested in doing. It is, however clear, that May 5, 1999 cannot come and go as if it was an ordinary day. Arafat will announce months before May 5, 1999 that the Palestinians will not declare independence unilaterally on that date, however the date will be marked by a special session of the Palestinian Executive and Legislative Authorities. Arafat will invite world leaders to attend the special session.

President Arafat will seek American and European support for an Israeli agreement to a one year extension of the Oslo agreement providing the Palestinian Authority with legal jurisdiction for one more year. The Americans will also make a commitment to the Palestinians that they will take an active role in convening intensive final status negotiations, if need be, in the Wye River style of direct, non-stop talks between the leadership of both sides with the Americans as a full partner in the process.

On May 5, 1999, at a special session of the PA and the PLC, President Arafat will decree that all parties have agreed to a one-year extension of the interim period and the beginning of non stop intensive final status talks. If, however, by May 5, 2000, there is no final status agreement, and it is clear that Israeli intransigence is the cause of the break down of the talks, the State of Palestine will be declared and the Governments of the United States and the European Union will recognize the legitimacy of the Palestinian state.

It is unlikely that the Government of the U.S. will agree to such terms, however it is possible to get such an agreement from most of the countries of Europe. The Palestinian position will be strengthened by agreeing, at their own initiative, to a year long extension of the interim period. There will be an international understanding that at the end of the year the Palestinian state will emerge. There will be an Israeli understanding (even if they reject the idea) that a Palestinian state will emerge at the end of negotiations and therefore, the negotiations will be focused on the nature of sovereignty and the boundaries of the state and not on the question of will there be a state or not.

Palestinians will win international support for taking such a moderate position. The issue of UDI will be removed from the Israeli political agenda during the election campaign. To some extent, there will be a sense of relief on the Palestinian street giving an extension to the chance of reaching some kind of agreement and not having to face a dead end with only violence in sight. The Palestinian authority will have an extra year to develop and play out their negotiating positions, all the time gaining US support and creating a more level playing field. And, as stated above, statehood will be the end result.

The difference between this strategy and the ideas offered by Dr. Yossi Beilin is that there is no requirement for an Israeli approval of Palestinian statehood (which is unlikely to be achieved) and is replaced by an understanding with the Americans and the Europeans about the final result after one year of additional interim status.

Alternative #3 - UDI & Peace

This strategy too is based on the Palestinians declaring independence unilaterally primarily because of the non-existence of any final status talks, or due to a lack of any real progress in final status talks. Arafat is convinced that he has no legal jurisdiction to continue to rule without changing the status of his authority and he has no partner on the Israeli side to agree to such a change. Months before the UDI, Arafat and his team of advisors begin drafting a Peace Treaty between the State of Palestine and the State of Israel. The American and European leadership is conferred with secretly in high level consultations aimed at drafting a Peace Treaty that Israel will be able to accept. The idea of the peace treaty is to create a plan that does not reflect a maximalist Palestinian position, but does not automatically give in to all of Israel's demands either. The consultations with the Americans and the Europeans are aimed at both seeking pre-emptive US and European Support for both UDI and the Peace Treaty, but also for conferring with them on the conditions that would make the Peace Treaty acceptable to Israel.

One the eve of May 5, 1999, President Arafat will address the nation and the world. In his address, he will stress the Palestinian desire to join the community of nations as an equal member. President Arafat will emphasize the Palestinian desire to live at peace. He will call upon the Palestinian people to commit themselves to living at peace. President Arafat will declare that the new born State of Palestine is born, under international legitimacy and based upon the Declaration of Independence from 1988. President Arafat will explain that peace is based upon compromise and that the Palestinians have accepted far less than they believe they legitimately deserve by right and by international law. However, in the interest of achieving peace and security, Palestine is issuing a Declaration of Peace based upon a Peace Treaty already signed and endorsed by the Palestinian Government and only lacking the signature of the Government of Israel. Furthermore, President Arafat calls on the international community to convene a special session of the United Nations General Assembly at which time the State of Palestine will be recognized by international law. President Arafat will call upon the President of the United States to make a State visit in Palestine and to urge Israel to restrain from any use of force against the State of Palestine. President Arafat will call upon the international community to double its financial support to help create stability and prosperity for all Palestinians. President Arafat will also call upon Palestinians everywhere they are to support the new State and to support peace, to apply for citizenship under the new Law of Return and to help build their new State.

The Government of Israel will initially reject the "offer" calling it a flagrant breach of the Oslo Agreement, of international law and of commitments given by the Palestinians to the Americans at Wye. The IDF will be called to be prepared to break up any "public disturbances" and to prevent the Palestinians from taking control of any territory beyond area "A". The Government of Israel will also call upon the international community and mainly the Americans not to recognize the Palestinian state and not to provide it with any legitimacy. However, if the Palestinians are successful in preventing violence on the ground, the Palestinians will also be very likely to succeed in increasing international pressure on Israel to enter into negotiations with the Palestinians on the basis of the draft peace treaty. The strategy of the Palestinians must be based, in this alternative, on constantly possessing the higher moral ground. The Palestinians are offering peace. The Palestinians are receiving independence which most of the international community already supports. The Palestinians are acting responsibly and Israel has become the primary obstacle to achieving peace, security and stability.

The Palestinians must also address their allies within Israel. The peace camp in Israel should be directly addressed by the Palestinian government and public figures to support the Independence of Palestine and the peace treaty with Israel. The peace camp can play an effective role and take to the streets because the Palestinians will have supplied them with the primary motivating element that has been lacking in the past years - the belief that peace can really be achieved.

Right now, any of the above could happen. What seems quite clear is that there won't be any progress in the way of peace before May 5, 1999. The Palestinians must decide which road to travel on. Once again, they must take action to determine their own history rather than turning themselves into the victims of history. While the Israeli side is frozen in internal political strife, the Palestinians should take upon themselves proactive steps aimed at producing desirable results for themselves. The authors of this paper hope that whatever course is followed, it will not produce violence and suffering for innocent people. We also hope that this paper will trigger some more creative thinking and strategic planning. We welcome your comments.