Today's Situation

Harsh recommendations, Monday, March 06, 2006

Trouble is, it is not at all clear what government policy is nowadays, since practically every Kadima politician has a different approach to dealing with Hamas, ranging from former Shin Bet chief Avi Dichter’s promise to either arrest the designated Hamas prime minister, Ismail Haniye, ‘or send him to meet with Sheikh Ahmed Yassin,’ the Hamas founder who was assassinated by Israel, to Shimon Peres’ insistence that Israel engage PA President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazin) in talks aimed at reaching some agreement. Furthermore, Kadima continues to be battered by reports of Sharon family corruption -- last night Channel 10 carried an astonishing report on Omri Sharon’s ‘diaries,’ reporting how, acting on behalf of his father, he filled dozens of government jobs with Likud central committee political allies -- or got their relatives cushy jobs. There are reports a new police investigation of Sharon’s actions will be ordered by the attorney general -- and Channel 10 is promising another series of revelations tonight.

The conventional wisdom about security, not ‘domestic’ issues being the key to the election campaign may be true, but with each passing day, media revelations about how the corruption in the Sharon administrations of the last five years is eroding support for Kadima. There won’t be new polls released until at least mid-week, but if the chatter on the current events shows this morning, after the Channel 10 report, is indicative, Kadima can expect another slide in its numbers, largely because of the close identification Kadima is trying to create between Sharon and Olmert, whose own practices as a politician have often led him to brushes with the law. True, as election strategist Arthur Finkelstein, working this year for Yisrael Beitenu, has said, Israeli voters prefer someone corrupt over someone naïve as their leader. But in 1977 and in 1992, two key years in which power shifted in an Israeli election, corruption eventually played a major role in the voting -- far more than the settlement and peace policies that became identified with the Likud (1977) and Labor (1992) after they were elected into office.

This week, the parties’ TV and radio advertising campaigns begins, and while they are unlikely on their own to create a dramatic shift in public opinion, there is a feeling that the seemingly massive support for Kadima is much more superficial than it appeared when Sharon was on his feet. Pollsters are now talking about as much as 20 percent of the electorate being undecided or at least not locked on their vote and some predict that number will rise as March 28 approaches, only declining on Election Day itself or the day before.

Trouble is, it is extremely difficult to predict which way voters escaping Kadima will turn if they turn away from the new party, which meanwhile rules Israel. Kadima’s own advertising is two-pronged: it adulates Sharon and hands over the reins to Olmert, and it attacks Binyamin Netanyahu, for there is great concern among Kadima strategists that ex-Likud voters could suddenly swerve back to the ‘home party.’ ‘Panicky, iresponsible Bibi,’ is the theme of those ads, ‘remember him? He uses fear, he thrives on your fear.’ The Kadima ads so far make light of Labor’s Amir Peretz, portraying him as a lightweight who doesn’t know English and hardly a threat. That might be a mistake. And there are indications that the two large parties to the Right of Likud, Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beitenu and the new National Union-National Religious Party are winning some of the slippage from Kadima and the Likud, which is still able to only dream about breaking through the 15-seat mark in the opinion polls. Labor was stuck over the weekend at the 20-seat mark, while Kadima was at 38-40. Likud, by the way, was outraged by billboards showing Netanyahu with Omri Sharon, ads put up by Kadima, as a reminder of how the Sharon’s ran the country. Omri, meanwhile, has issued a statement saying that he has left politics - and that what he did was done by all the parties that ever held power in Israel.

As for the Hamas -- it has still to form a government, and while it is proud that its foreign delegation visited Moscow, the breach between the foreign Hamas leadership, meaning Khaled Mishal and company, and the domestic Hamas, meaning those Hamas leaders who live in Gaza and the West Bank, is slowly widening. Already, there are spats over the foreigners trying to dictate policy to the domestic Hamas leaders, who are much less eager for Iranian support than Mishal, for example. Hamas’ delay in forming a government might be tactical -- as long as it is not the actual government, international aid, if not Israeli, will flow, and the transitional government can continue operating for weeks to come. Besides, constitutionally, Abbas is head of state and the government serves at his pleasure. And so far, he has made clear he wants a government that at the every least abides by all the previously signed agreements the PA reached with Israel, which as far as the Palestinians are concerned, would mean implicit Hamas recognition of Israel. The message Hamas is getting from foreign countries so far is that responsible governments do not abrogate international agreements reached by previous governments, and if Hamas wants to be taken seriously, it must behave responsibly. That was the message the Russians delivered to the Mishal delegation. The pressure on Hamas is so great that one of the delegation members was quoted as saying that Hamas understands it ‘will have to change -- but so will Israel.’

Will Israel change? It’s doubtful, but much depends on the elections. There’s an eagerness among Israelis to believe that more ‘unilateral disengagements’ will make their lives quieter, which is about the most Israelis hope for nowadays -- peace, as a viable concept is pretty much off the agenda. Olmert’s message is not he’ll bring peace, but that a Kadima government will draw Israel’s final borders. But considering the final borders that Kadima’s spokesmen are talking about essentially carve the West Bank into small enclaves of Palestinian ‘self-rule’ that the Israelis want to call a state, and leave much more than 7-8 percent along the Green Line in Israeli hands, it is highly unlikely that the ‘unilateral disengagement’ will guarantee Israel anything other than more conflict with the Palestinians and more international disapproval. And meanwhile, there is mounting opposition to more unilateral disengagements, because they would reward Hamas for its immoderation instead of forcing it into flexibility.

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